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EU Enlargement and Monetary Regimes from the Insurance 
Model Perspectives 
 
I. Introduction 
 
No in-depth observations are required to see that the economic, political and in general social 
behaviour of individuals, groups, elites, and key players in the post-communist countries has 
changed after these countries joined EU. Indeed, these changes manifest themselves to a 
different extent and take various forms. Following the EU accession, certain trends, such as 
the lack of motivation and discipline, non-cooperation and nationalism, are clearly 
observable. At the concrete economic level, this is also evident with fiscal discipline being 
largely undermined and public finances registering fast deficit trends, currency anchors losing 
their credibility and discipline effects and private sector debt growing rapidly. The ensuing 
trend was of an economic system based on accumulating debt rather than on fiscal and 
monetary discipline1.  
 
In this situation, the logical question arises: How could we account for this change in the new 
countries? In fact, this question arises not only when observing the period of membership, but 
also when we look at the entire period of transformation – the 20 years of cyclic and uneven 
developments of alternating discipline with voluntarism, cooperation with opportunism2. This 
same problem also comes up when we try to find an explanation for the differences in the 
evolution and the diversity of trajectories across countries, periods, and geographic areas (the 
so-called “variety of transformation”)3. 
 
The theoretical answers to these issues can be various but many common elements and 
theoretical bridges often link them. In my view, the insurance model of currency crises 
proposed more than ten years ago by Michael Dooley (Dooley, 1997; Dooley, 2000) and 
                                                 
1Actually, what is now happening in Greece and in the euro area in general has similar explanations with those 
given in this article. 
2 See Ialnazov and Nenovsky (2011), about the interpretation of transition from the perspective of cooperation 
and game theory.  On social anchors and the euro-integration process, see also Ialnazov (2003). 
3 Without exhaustiveness, we could mention Abdelal (2001), Aslund (2002), Colombatto (2002), Beck and 
Laeven (2005), Csaba (2007), Pejovich (2003), Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005), Winiecki (2004), etc. 
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empirically applied to the East Asian and Latin American countries (Chinn et al., 1999), after 
being expanded and given a new theoretical interpretation, provides good possibilities for 
analysing the post communist evolution. This model, when examined within a broader context 
(not in its narrow meaning as the currency crises interpretation), as in this particular case the 
overall dynamics of the economic system, holds an extraordinary potential for development 
by including a number of elements from other models and theories. Expanded and enriched, 
while also given a new direction, the insurance game model acquires both an explanatory 
power and the potential to apply a set of measures that could be useful for dealing with the so-
called "bad" dynamics witnessed not only in the new EU member-states, but at the EU level 
as well. The insurance model offers a number of concrete ideas about the level of collateral 
(foreign reserves), about the relationship between monetary regime (currency anchor) and 
euro membership (political anchor), and many others. 
 
The article’s main objectives, and the novelties relative to previous studies, are to propose the 
building blocks of a theoretical model that could explain the dynamics of post-communist 
countries. The aim is to substantiate the logical succession of cause-and-effect relations and 
their possible interpretations. After a brief outline of Dooley’s insurance model, we offer our 
argumentation of the directions in which the model could be expanded and how it could be 
adapted for the purpose of the interpretation of the post-communist countries. The article 
suggests two types of formalizations and illustrations of the model:  the first by means of a 
simple linear model and the second, using a graphical representation and introducing some 
new concepts such as “insurance possibility frontier”, “market for insurable funds”, etc. 
Finally, we offer a discussion on the theoretical and empirical potentials and limitations of the 
proposed model.  
 
II. Dooley’s insurance model and its extensions for post communist period 
 
Within the context of discussing currency crises, Michael Dooley put forward a model, a 
variant of the first generation model of currency crises, expanded to include the issues of 
moral hazard, the role of banking sector and in general, expanding and redefining assets and 
liabilities of economic players (Dooley, 1997; 2000). 
 
The main idea of the model is the assumption that there is a logical cause-and-effect chain, 
which leads to a crisis. The major reason for a crisis is the following. The government is 
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under a borrowing constraint, i.e. it cannot borrow currently against future revenue. In this 
situation, its net external assets operate as a tool to achieve two objectives. The first objective 
is to serve as collateral securing the government itself, its liabilities, external debt mainly. The 
second objective consists to act as a collateral for the private bank sector liabilities (to non-
residents), as it is assumed that the government will fulfil its lender-of-last-resort function. 
The government becomes a credible insurer and self-insurer. These net government assets 
(and in Dooley’s model these assets are approximated with official foreign reserves), when 
positive, are considered a free insurance against a bank crisis and serve as a powerful 
incentive for non-resident investors to use this free insurance. After initial constraint 
loosening, following some form of initial shock expressed in international interest rates 
decline, different forms of debt cancelation, accorded credit lines, etc., the return on deposits 
becomes attractive to non-residents, thereby rising capital inflows. The free insurance 
intensifies the banks fight for deposits; the banks offer increasingly higher interest rates on 
these deposits. The capital inflows lead to growing liabilities in the private sector. Once they 
equalize with the government’s net external assets the dynamics reverses, an attack on the 
insurance fund starts and a crisis begins. The interest rate spread melts and non-residents start 
withdrawing their deposits. Banks, in turn, are forced to sell assets and collect the deposit 
insurance from the government. Generally, Dooley believes that there are three preconditions 
for such a crisis, namely: (i) the external assets of the government should have a net positive 
figure; (ii) government’s commitment should be credible, i.e. the government should be ready 
to spend these assets to pay its debt and save the banking system, and (iii) private investors 
should have a free access, i.e. there is no capital control. 
 
Moreover, Dooley’s model can be expanded with new elements, related for instance  to the 
role of foreign reserves (collateral) uncertainty, which the government is ready and able to 
mobilize – i.e. uncertainty seen as a trigger of crisis (Aizenmann and Marion, 1999). 
Alternatively, by including asymmetry of information (adverse selection) of bank assets 
(Furman and Stiglitz, 1998), which intensifies with the increase of deposits, the collateral 
secures increasingly risky liabilities4. Subsequently, Dooley’s model was applied to Latin 
America and Asia and gives relatively good explanations of the crises in these regions (Chinn 
et al., 1999).  
 
                                                 
4 On these models, as well as on a discussion of the currency crises types see also the presentation by Artus 
(2000) and Allegret (2005). 
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This in general outlines the theoretical miniature model, which, in my view, could be used as 
the basis for understanding the developments over the last 20 years in the former socialist 
countries. What are the directions, in which the model could expand? 
 
First, the model could be interpreted in a much broader sense as a complex linkage between 
anchor, its credibility and the dynamics of the collateral, linkage that shapes the differences 
across countries. Second, the model could be expanded to include two anchors (in this case 
monetary regime and EU membership) while also describing the relationship between them 
and arriving at a relation of the mutually enhancing or eliminating effect of the two anchors. 
Within a concrete context this could be expressed as the inclusion of three new functional 
dependences, in particular (i) the insurance premium as a function of the collateral’s dynamics 
(which is implied though not formalized with Dooley) of (ii) foreign reserves as a function of 
the credibility of the anchor (anchors), and finally – (iii) the relationship between these 
anchors. Third, the model can include a number of dependences stemming from the 
relationship between external transfers (in this particular case – EU pre-accession and EU 
structural funds), moral hazard, deformation of information and incentives, redistribution 
processes etc. 
 
The insurance game has its specific features during the three stages of transition that could be 
differentiated and interpreted in the following way:  the stage one (T1) is from the onset of 
transition until the second half of 1990s when a decision was taken for EU enlargement to 
include the new countries and the accession processes commenced; the second stage (T2) is 
until the actual EU accession (the beginning of the first decade of 21 c.); and stage three (T3) 
concerns the post EU accession (countries became full members). In a sense, a fourth stage 
could also be differentiated, i.e. after the adoption of the euro5, but we think the character of 
this stage does not allow placing it at the same level as the other three.  
 
In the first period Т1 – from the collapse of the socialist system until the start of negotiations 
– the sequence of events and relations is the following. After the Soviet bloc’s disintegration, 
the choice of a geostrategic orientation and national identity became a most pressing issue (for 
details see Abdelal, 2001), a choice which is key to interpreting the chain of events and the 
diversity of trajectories across countries and groups of countries. This choice is manifested in 
                                                 
5 Currently only Slovakia and Slovenia are euro area members. 
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two basic anchors, namely economic and political. In our view, money and monetary regimes 
fulfill the main functions of an economic anchor, while the political regime and the EU 
membership or non-membership fulfils the basic functions of a political anchor. 
 
Without going into details, we will note that the anchor’s main function is to coordinate the 
expectations, interests, and behaviour of the key social players6. The anchor plays two basic 
roles, i.e. discipline effect and credibility effect. In turn, the two effects are sometimes 
mutually enforcing, other times they are mutually eliminating.  
 
Thus, the historical review of the last 20 years shows that the countries within the socialist 
bloc were characterised by different trends and groupings7. We could illustrate this with the 
Baltic countries whose main goal was to part quickly with the Soviet influence and integrate 
into the modern Western community. This strategic choice needed a signal that would fix the 
radical abandoning of the rouble zone through the choice of currency board arrangements. 
Currency board is a legally fixed exchange rate to a strong western currency, monetary base 
coverage, and elimination of the discretionary monetary policy as "hands-tying mechanisms.” 
Later on, these countries carried out rapid economic and political liberalization as a total 
negation of the planned system followed by speedy EU integration. Relatively similar, 
although slower, developments took place in the other Central European countries – Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, while the other countries from South Europe – to 
mention Bulgaria and Romania – took a different type of trajectory with more variability and 
hesitations of their monetary regimes and geo-political choices. We are not going to discuss 
other countries that are currently non-EU member-states; still we could point as an example 
Ukraine, Serbia, Moldova, and partly Belarus, where the variability of the national choice is 
high, which precludes the emergence of a stable monetary and political anchor. 
 
Overall, at point Т1, the economic or monetary anchor was the leading and the only one 
actually existing, and it was still unclear whether EU would enlarge. It served as a 
manifestation of the national choice and its task was to indicate a departure from the Soviet 
bloc and integration into the bloc of modern and advanced market economies (just as the 
                                                 
6 The integrating social role of money was noted quite some time ago (see Simmel, 1990 [1900, 1907]), as well 
as the fact that it is an important part of the national identity (Helleiner, 1998, 2003). As regards the discipline 
effect, the credibility effect and the confidence effect, and their links, see Raybaut and Torre (2005) who analyse 
them in relation to the currency boards in Europe. On the role of the broad institutional context, in which a 
monetary regime fits, see Ball (1999), Nenovsky (2006).  
7 On the evolution of monetary regimes in post communists countries, see Nenovsky (2006, 2009). 
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adoption of the gold standard in late 19 c. was considered a strategic, national and 
civilisationary choice in some peripheral countries – such as Russia, Japan, the Balkans, etc.). 
The choice of a fixed exchange rate as a form of a monetary regime was dictated by the desire 
for credibility, which did not exist at all in the old communist system, even more so that there 
was no such thing as communist central bank independence. In order for these fixed exchange 
rate regimes to start functioning, cancellation of foreign debts and accumulation of minimum 
foreign reserves were needed8. This was achieved in various ways – foreign loans were 
extended; a number of blocked foreign reserves with western countries were recovered; debts 
were cancelled, etc. This ultimately led to the emergence of a minimum level of credibility 
and a positive value of net external assets, i.e. of collateral. It was exactly at this time that the 
insurance game started, whose logic we explained above. The quick liberalization and 
increased economic flexibility (e.g., one extreme case is Estonia) made it possible to limit and 
countervail the adverse effects of the insurance process9. 
 
At Т2 period a new anchor emerged, i.e. the decision for enlargement and the start of the 
negotiation process for membership. It is important to note that at that time no commitments 
were taken by EU, both in general political terms and in terms of an aid plan for crises, 
lender-of-last-resort, etc., that could widen the collateral and boost up the insurance game. 
The lack of a guarantee made it possible for the two anchors (monetary and political) to move 
in the same direction and in a way to enhance each other. The efforts of the key players, and 
the public at large, were aimed at complying with the restrictions and preparing for 
membership. The new anchor introduced the fresh infusion of credibility needed to sustain the 
growing trend of the insurance game. In other words, the new fresh EU anchor compensated 
the diminishing marginal importance of the old (monetary) anchor. We can say that the 
credibility effect and the confidence effect are single acting. Credibility increase led to a 
strong capital inflow, i.e. to an increase in the banking sector liabilities, to which we could 
add the pre-accession funds that started to flow in. Some of the countries, especially those 
from Central Europe, gradually moved to exchange rates that are more flexible or to 
alternatives of inflation targeting. The Baltic countries retained their fixed exchange rates just 
                                                 
8 This bears a resemblance to the policy of mercantilism from past centuries, when international reserves were 
considered  a symbol of autonomy, independence, power and in general  part of the reputation of a country (or 
rather of a monarch). 
9 The existence of flexibility of prices and labour market is the major element for the success of fixed and rigid 
monetary regimes, which  has been known ever since the operation of the gold standard (Desquilbet and 
Nenovsky, 2005), while it could be theoretically deduced within the conventional theory on currency crises 
(Irwin, 2004). 
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as Bulgaria did by introducing a currency board in mid-1997, but tried to compensate with 
introducing more markets flexibilities. 
 
In the last phase, Т3, after joining EU, things changed. A range of guarantees emerged, 
mostly implicit, for intervention in times of crises. The processes of insecurity as regards the 
value of collateral heightened, and so did the processes of asymmetry of information and 
moral hazard in the banking system. Generally, the restriction was lifted and a shift to soft 
budget constraints was made while the credibility effect and the discipline effect started to 
work on each other adversely10. The new anchor began to undermine the credibility of the 
monetary anchor, notably the fixed exchange rate regimes. Reliance now was upon the new 
anchor and the old one was no longer appreciated, which caused shock to the collateral and its 
deterioration (the role of foreign reserves declines while the role of implicit aid increases). In 
a sense, we can speak of a process of driving out the explicit, visible and clear anchor 
(monetary regime) by the implicit, invisible and insecure (EU). The first anchor improves the 
discipline effect while the second worsens it. This holds the analogies with the Gresham’s law 
of bad money driving out good money. The new structural funds amplify moral hazard, 
deform incentives and motivations, and fuel the fight for these funds’ misappropriation. Non-
cooperative strategies come to prevail, which ultimately widens social differentiation11. 
 
 
III. Two formalized representations of the model 
 
The above interpretations and expanded versions of Dooley’s model could be represented in 
different ways. Below we have given two such possible variants – the first one is functional 
                                                 
10 The danger of loosening budget restriction, increasing moral hazard and diminishing the credibility of 
monetary authorities within the context of monetary coordination and monetary union have long been an object 
of analysis, see Rogoff (1985) who demonstrates deterioration of the welfare in the participating countries. As 
Feldstein points out (1988) “Governments may not take the politically painful steps that they should because 
they believe that foreign actions will make such policies unnecessary or because they want to use their lack of 
action as part of a bargaining strategy to induce desire policies on the part of foreign governments”, p. 11. The 
same author also mentions the existence of this "free rider” to EU and the euro area years later (Feldstein 
(2005)), while today the loosening of budget constraints and the underestimation of this process in EU is 
recognised, see Bini-Smagni (2010). 
11 In Ialnazov and Nenovsky (2011) the above three phases of post-communist transition are interpreted from the 
perspectives of the relative predominance of cooperative and non-cooperative strategies within the framework of 
two types of big social games – “the prisoner’s dillema” (lack of a common goal) and “the stag hunter" (the 
existence of a common goal). Respectively, these two types of meta-games depend on the existence and the 
character of anchors. On the adverse impact of foreign aid see the analyses of Bauer (2000), Williamson (2010). 
In the light of the above we can suggest the hypothesis, extravagant at first glance, that the lower the utilisation 
of euro funds, the better this economy develops.  
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and offers a system of linear equations illustrating the cause-and-effect relations, and the 
second is a graphic representation and introduces some new concepts adapted from other 
branches of the economic knowledge. 
 
Functional representation 
The model in a simplified form could be represented by using the following relations: 
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Where equation (1) (the only one that we borrow from Dooley) shows demand for deposits by 
non-residents dd as a function of real interest rates on deposits r, risk-free real interest rates 
abroad r*, and additional return α, which non-residents would require in case of a lack of 
insurance. Demand for deposits grows with the increase of interest rates spread and declines 
with the increase of insurance premium. We introduce the equations (2) and (3) that capture 
the logic of our model extension. Equation (2) shows the negative link between this premium 
α and the collateral, in this case approximated with net external assets of the government, or 
even closer with foreign reserves F. Finally, equation (3) indicates the supposedly positive 
connection between the collateral's dynamics, F, and the power of the anchor’s credibility (in 
this case the monetary regime) λ1. 
 
We are examining three periods, of course with all conditionalities. The first period, Т1, 
covers the time before the start of negotiations for EU membership. The second period, Т2, 
after start of negotiations until accession, and the third period, Т3, is the period after the 
official entry. While the first period is characterised by the existence of one anchor, in this 
case λ1, which reflects the monetary regime (either exchange rate target or inflation target), in 
the second and third period a second, already external, anchor emerges (EU membership), λ2. 
While in Т1 this anchor plays a mobilizing, stimulating and disciplining role for the countries 
heading for membership, and overall both anchors – internal and external – move in a single 
direction and act in synchrony.  
Thus in Т2: 
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The equation (4) describes the amplifying effect of the second anchor on the first anchor 
(+γ1). 
 
And in Т3: 
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In this period Т3 there is every logical and empirical evidence to assume that the second, 
external anchor – EU membership – brings detriment to and undermines the credibility of the 
monetary regime anchor (-γ1). Besides, in equation (3), we add the second anchor λ2 in 
explaining foreign reserves dynamics. Of course, at first approximation, the functional 
correlations are taken as linear, which is clearly a simplification, because non-linear 
dependences could be surmised12. 
 
In Т1, after transformations, we arrive at the following dependence between insurance 
premium and anchor credibility: 11101011010 )( λβαβααλββααα −−=+−= .  
From where it follows that 011
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12 We could presume for example that the premium movement depends not only on the level, but also on the rate 
of growth of foreign reserves dt
dFF 210 αααα −−= . 
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βα > , because 11 <γ , i.e. the sensitivity of the premium to the credibility of 
the new anchor is growing, which is logical since the external anchor amplifies the internal 
one. This, however, is not the case with period Т3, where the new anchor disables the first one 
and cannot offset it. After the transformation, we have: 
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It is clear that while in the first two periods deposit demand is magnified first by one, then by 
both anchors through reducing the risk premium, at T3 a reversal occurs with non-residents 
starting to withdraw their deposits, or at worst, the inflow quickly subsides. Chart 1 shows the 
presumable relations between anchor λ1 and insurance premium α in the examined periods Т1, 
Т2 and Т3. 
 
Chart 1 Anchors dynamics and insurance premium in T1, T2 and T3 
 
 
 
Graphical representation 
The logic of the exposed model could be presented graphically and this allows for playing 
different scenarios. For this purpose we use and adapt familiar concepts from other spheres of 
the economic knowledge. To be more specific we introduce (i) the insurance possibilities 
frontier (similar to the production possibilities frontier), (ii) insurance funds market (similarly 
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to loanable funds market) and (iii) time structure of private liabilities, deposits (similar to the 
time structure of capital). The above is triggered by the structure of Roger Garrison’s 
macroeconomic model (Garrison, 2001) used on another occasion and for other purposes. 
Chart 2 Graphical presentation of insurance model 
Lp
Φ
Lg Lg, Φ
Lg
Lp
A B
B
A
Φ
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1
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r - r*- α
 
The insurance possibilities frontier is illustrated in Chart (2/1). She shows the possibilities of 
the government’s collateral (Ф) to cover the insurance of different combinations of public 
liabilities Lg and private liabilities Lp. We can see that Ф is a resource, an instrument used for 
two purposes. Further, down we will see that this frontier can change and modify in the period 
of EU membership.  
 
Chart (2/2) illustrates the insurance funds market (collateral market) where Ф stands for the 
government’s supply of funds, while demand is represented by the external liabilities of the 
public and private sectors (Lg + Lp). The cost of these funds is approximated by the interest 
margin and the insurance premium )( * α−− rr . Point А is characterized by equilibrium and Ф 
covers public liabilities, so we can suppose that at this point α = 0. In the event of lifting of 
the restriction, which we discussed in Part 2, i.e. if return is higher than market return, in point 
В private liabilities can be insured, i.e. collateralized (Ф > Lg).  
 
Moreover, the last component in the Chart is (2/3), which shows the time structure of private 
liabilities, of deposits. At a given volume of deposits, long-term deposits are positioned in 
point А, and in point B – the short-term deposits. Foreign depositors can view the maturity 
structure of deposits as an expression of the risk structure and the preferences for risk and 
liquidity.  
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Chart 3 shows a static form of the model with an equilibrium on the insurance funds market 
reflected in a definite level of the insurance frontier and resulting in a definite structure of 
deposits13. This could be viewed as the natural state of preferences as well as a state, where 
the insurance game has stopped. 
 
Chart 3 Insurance model in equilibrium  
 
 
 
Things take an interesting development when the model is dynamised, and in fact, the 
possibilities are numerous. We will discuss just a few of them. Chart 4 shows what would 
follow a shock, the return on deposits exceeds market return, and a free insurance emerges. 
Then the movement is to point В and above the borderline in point D, i.e. the insurance 
possibilities of the collateral are split, ultimately leading to variation of the term structure of 
deposits. Both shortest-term, speculative, deposits and those with very long maturity increase, 
which destroys the structure of bank liabilities and assets (in the chart this is presented as 
moves from A to B, from A to C). When Ф is conveyed with Lg, a fight starts for quick 
appropriation of the free insurance, run on deposits, disinvestment, and crisis in general. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 It is possible to include other components of analysis, especially for determining the price of insurance funds, 
i.e. modelling of the interest rate differential α. 
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Chart 4 Insurance model after the shock that bring positive net asset value of the collateral 
 
 
 
From here, we can simulate various others shocks and economic policy measures. We could 
see for instance how EU membership could affect the basic components of the model. The 
possibilities here are also various, one of the basic could involve bringing insecurity (ε) into 
the insurance possibilities frontier ( ε±Ф ); when the volume of the collateral is not clear, 
which largely speeds up the insurance game. 
 
It would be interesting to note that the model proposed here not only holds a number of 
external similarities with the model proposed by Roger Garrison (2001), but also actually 
illustrates dependences and relations, which are in synchrony with the main ideas of 
Garrison’s model. The injection of additional money supply totally fits into the framework of 
an exogenous shock, which reduces the international interest rates below the national ones, 
adjusted with the insurance premium, and the resulting above-market return (due to the free 
insurance) attracts capitals. In turn, this has dynamic effects on the assets and liabilities of 
banks, consumption, investments, and the structure of production and capital.  
 
Concluding remarks  
In conclusion, it is reasonable to discuss the theoretical and empirical limits of the presented 
model. First, in theoretical terms there are several possible developments.  These concern 
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mostly refinement and development of all functional relations, assuming their various 
nonlinear forms. Another direction in which a lot of work is needed is the theoretical 
compounding of the anchors (λ1 and and λ2) in order to make them operational and easier to 
measure. Theoretical improvements also bear on the graphical model, where the key 
components presented in our paper were in a most common and simple way. This concerns 
the Insurance possibilities frontier, the market for insurable funds and term structure of 
deposits, they all should be make more realistic. For example, as already mentioned, it is 
necessary to incorporate uncertainty and dynamics into Insurance possibilities frontier.  
 
Secondly, the confrontation of our model with reality needs its basic notions and concepts to 
be quantified and statistically checked. Of course, empirical verification cannot prove a theory 
by itself but a movement of statistical data in a satisfactory way would be of benefit to the 
model itself. No doubt, quantification and empirical verification is an extremely difficult 
work. The important thing is to find the reasonable approximations for the fundamental 
variables. For example, an approximate of monetary anchor λ1, could be the behaviour of 
various monetary variables (currency in circulation/deposits ratios, money multiplier 
volatility, CDS premiums etc.) or the results based on different polls14. Concerning the 
political, EU anchor λ2 and its impact on new members, things are more complicated15. 
Important quantitative work is necessary when definition of collateral, either explicit or 
implied, and accurate measurement of public and private liabilities is needed. Finally, it is 
important to build a coherent set of practical proposals that can form the basis of an economic 
policy that seeks to prevent and counter the emergence of the insurance game, and to mitigate 
its consequences when the game appears. 
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